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INTRODUCTION

Since World War II the countries divided by the line separating the
hostile systems in East and West have been trouble spots on the political
map of the world. On several occasions they have developed into something
far more dangerous. For this reason, not only the political but also the juridical "management" of relations within such pluri-system nations deserve
to be analyzed and compared very closely. Among such relations, the "German question" has, without a doubt, stimulated political as well as legal
thought to the highest degree. Some of the legal constructs by which German doctrine and practice have tried to reconcile goals and necessities can
perhaps serve as model or inspiration for other cases.'

t Paper delivered at the Conference on Contemporary Issues of International Law, June
26-28, 1984, in Taipei.
* Director of the Institute of Public International Law and Professor of International
Law at the University of Munich.
1. A. BERNARDINI. LA QUESTIONE TEDESCA NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (The German

Question in International Law) (1973); Bernhardt, Deutschland nach 30 Jahren Grundgesetz
(Germany After Thirty Years of the Basic Law), 38 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER (Publications by the Union of German Constitutional Law Teachers) 7 (1980); D. BLUMENWITZ, WAS IST DEUTSCHLAND? STAATS-UND
VOLKERRECHTLICHE GRUNDSXTZE ZUR DEUTSCHEN FRAGE UND IHRE KONSEQUENZEN FOR
DIE DEUTSCHE OSTPOLITIK (What is Germany? Principles of Constitutional and International
Law Relating to the German Question and Their Consequences for German Ostpolitik)
(1982); H. BOCKING. DER RECHTSSTATUS DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES (THE LEGAL STATUS OF
THE GERMAN REICH) (1979); ZEHN JAHRE DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK. DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER
BEZIEHUNGEN ZWISCHEN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND UND DER DEUTSCHEN
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1945-1972:

THE RISE OF Two GERMAN STATES

The international legal problems of the "German question" began with
the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces2 and the Potsdam
Declaration of June 5, 1945, by which the four Allied Governments assumed "supreme authority with respect to Germany," adding however, that
this did not effect an annexation and that the boundaries and the status of
Germany would be determined later.' The intention thus declared has since

DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK 1969-1979 (Ten Years of Deutschlandpolitik. The Development
of Relations Between the FRG and GDR 1969-1979) (Bundesministerium ftir innerdeutsche
Beziehungen (Foreign Ministry for Intra-German Relations) ed. 1980); H.M. CATUDAL, JR.,
THE DIPLOMACY OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN. A NEW ERA IN EAST-WEST
POLITICS (1978); G. DOEKER & J. BROCKNER, 1-3 THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979); Geck, Germany

and Contemporary International Law. 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 263 (1974); J. HACKER, DER
RECHTSSTATUS DEUTSCHLANDS AUS DER SICHT DER DDR (The Legal Status of Germany as

Seen by the GDR) (1974); Freiherr von der Heydte, Die Entwicklung der deutschen Rechtslage (The Development of the German Legal Situation), 11 JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES
RECHT (Yearbook for International Law) 137 (1962); Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany
According to the Declaration of Berlin, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 518 (1945); Mann, Germany's
Present Legal Status Revisited, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 760 (1967); Meyrowitz, Les deux
etats allemands (The Two States of Germany), 16 ANNUAIRE FRAN;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (French Yearbook of International Law) 85 (1970); Minch, Die valkerrechtliche
Grundlage des Status Deutschlands (The International Basis of Germany's Status) INTERNATIONALES RECHT UND DIPLOMATIE (International Law and Diplomacy) 143 (1971); 1 DoKUMENTE DES GETEILTEN DEUTSCHLAND (Documents of Divided Germany) (I. von MUnch ed.
1968); 2 DOKUMENTE DES GETEILTEN DEUTSCHLAND (Documents of Divided Germany) (I.
von Mfinch ed. 1974); N. POUNDS, DIVIDED GERMANY AND BERLIN (1962); G. RESS, DIE
RECHTSLAGE DEUTSCHLANDS NACH DEM GRUNDLAGENVERTRAG VOM 21 DEZEMBER 1972
(The Legal Status of Germany After the Basic Treaty of December 21, 1972) (1978); K.
SCHMID, DIE DEUTSCHE FRAGE IM STAATS- UND VOLKERRECHT (The German Question in
Constitutional and International Law) (1980); R. SCHUSTER, DEUTSCHLANDS STAATLICHE ExISTENZ IM WIDERSTREIT POLITISCHER UND RECHTLICHER GESICHTSPUNKTE 1945-1963 (Germany's Existence as a State in the Clash of Political and Legal Views 1945-1963) (1963); 1-11
DOKUMENTATION ZUR DEUTSCHLANDFRAGE (Documents on the German Question) (H. Sie-

gler ed. 1961-1979); K. Skubiszewski, The Great Powers and the Settlement in Central Europe, 18 JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT (Yearbook for International Law) 92
(1975); K. WILKE, BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND UND DEUTSCHE DEMOKRATISCHE REPUBLIK. GRUNDLAGEN UND AUSGEWXHLTE PROBLEME DES GEGENSEITIGEN VERHXLTNISSES DER

BEIDEN DEUTSCHEN STAATEN (FRG and GDR. Fundamentals and Selected Problems of the
Relationship Between the Two German States) (1976); FONF JAHRE GRUNDVERTRAGSURTEIL
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (Five Years After the Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Basic Treaty) (G. Ziegler ed. 1979).
2. Act of Military Surrender, May 7 and 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1857, Executive Agreement

Series 502, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 169 (Supp. 1945).
3. Potsdam Declaration, June 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, T.I.A.S. No. 1520, 68 U.N.T.S.
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been corroborated by Allied practice, 4 and has supported the German doctrine that the German Reich survived the events of 1945 and that German
statehood continued to exist, albeit under a regime of belligerent occupation
unparalleled in its comprehensiveness.
The outbreak of the Cold War, however, fostered the readiness of the
occupying powers to grant increasing internal autonomy to the German authorities in their respective zones. In 1949, both the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 5 of the Federal Republic of Germany and an East German constitution came into force, 6 giving birth to two dependent states, each of which
claimed identity with the still existing German Reich. By the Convention
on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany (Generalvertrag) signed on October 23, 1954, the r6gime of occupation was terminated and the Federal Republic of Germany granted "the' 7
full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs.
The Western Allies - France, England and the United States - retained,
however, "the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by
them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement." All signatories agreed that a
reunified Germany was their common aim. The sovereignty of the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) was thus viewed as being subject to substantial reservations and its existence considered as a merely provisional arrangement. In the same year, the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
achieved Eastern-type sovereignty with second thoughts. 9 Within a few
months the two German states carried out their part of the bargain by joining NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 10 respectively.
At about this time, official GDR doctrine abandoned the theory of
identity in favor of the idea of "two states in Germany." Since 1956 the
GDR has regarded itself as one of two successor states of a German Reich
extinguished as a subject of international law through the unconditional

190.
4. 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 333 (1963).
5. The Basic Law is to govern the FRG until unification occurs. At such time the
Grundgesetz will be superseded by a Constitution approved by the people of a unified German
state. Hobson, The European Community and East-West German Relations, 19 VA. J. INT'L
L. 45 (1978).
6. 3 A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 361, 334 (rev. 3d ed. 1968).
7. Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23,
1954, art. I, para. 2, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 4121, T.I.A.S. No. 3425; see also Bishop, The "Contractual Agreements" with the Federal Republic of Germany, 49 AM. J.INT'L L. 125 (1955).
8. Id., art. 11,para. 1, at 4122.
9. 1 G. DOEKER & J. BROCKNER, supra note 1, at 160.
10. 2 G. DOEKER & J. BROCKNER, supra note 1, at 32.
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surrender of 1945.11
The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, continued to
uphold the doctrine of its identity with the Reich as it existed within the
frontiers of December 31, 1937. The Bonn government considered itself the
only legitimate government of Germany as a whole, and only de facto prevented from exercising jurisdiction in the "Soviet-occupied zone," as the
GDR was called, by a sort of cold civil war. The Western Allies agreed that
Bonn was "entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs," 12 but never went as far as recognizing_
the Federal Government as the de jure government of all Germany. s
Despite this rejection, Bonn used every means at its disposal to come as
close to Alleinvertretung (sole representation) as possible. It declared itself
bound by the pre-war treaties of the German Reich as well as by all other
obligations and was ready to pay both the debts of the Reich and reparations. 4 It considered only one German citizenship to exist-a doctrine
which in the 1950's was relatively easy to sustain because until 1967 nationality questions were governed by one and the same law, of 1913, in both
parts of Germany." With respect to conflicts of law, the GDR was treated,
at least in principle, as being part of the legal order of the FRG. According
to the so-called Hallstein Doctrine, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR by states with whom the Federal Republic of Germany
entertained such relations, was considered an unfriendly act in disregard of
the right of self-determination of the German people, to be answered with

11. D.

BLUMENWITZ,

supra note 1, at 29; J.HACKER, supra note 1, at 154; J. PECK, DIE

REPUBLIK (The International Legal Personality of the GDR) 16 (1960); R. SCHUSTER, supra note 1, at 166; K.
WILKE, supra note 1, at 56.
12. F. A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 694 (1973).
VOLKERRECHTSSUBJEKTIVITXT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN

13. C. ARNDT, DIE VERTR.GE VON MOSKAU UND WARSCHAU. POLITISCHE, VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE UND VOLKERRECHTLICHE ASPEKTE (The Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw. Political, Constitutional and International Legal Aspects) 128 (2d ed. 1982); R. SCHUSTER, supra
note 1, at 188; 1 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 4, at 916; K. WILKE, supra note 1, at 73.

14. Hoenicke, Die Fortgeltung von Vertigen des deutschen Reiches in der BRD und der
DDR (The Continuance of Treaties by the German Reich in the FRG and the GDR), 14
REIHE ALLGEMEINES VOLKERRECHT (General International Law Series) 129 (1972); Rumpf',
Die deutsche Frage und die Reparationen (The German Question and Reparations), 33 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLKNDISCHES-C)FFENTLICHES

RECHT AND VOLKERRECHT

(Journal of Foreign,

Public and International Law) 344 (1973); London Agreement on German External Debts of
1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2792, 333 U.N.T.S. 3.
15. Zieger, Das Problem der deutschen Staatsangehi~rigkeit (The Problem of German
Citizenship), in FONF JAHRE GRUNDVERTRAGSURTEIL DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
(Five Years After the Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Basic Treaty) 189
(G. Zieger ed. 1979).
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the rupture of diplomatic relations and the closing of the purse.1"
Of course, such persistence was not without effect. As late as 1966, the
House of Lords in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler regarded the
GDR "not as a sovereign State, but as an organisation subordinate to the
U.S.S.R.," and emanations of the East German authorities as acts of
subordinate bodies of the U.S.S.R. 17 Apart from such demonstrations of
loyalty, however, the West German policy of denying the GDR international respectability on the political level and a clearcut status on the legal
level, became less and less successful. What it did achieve was a total paralysis in intra-German relations.
III. THE

BASIC TREATY:

1972

From 1969 on, the new Ostpolitik - a policy of d6tente - of Federal
Chancellor Brandt, attempted to break this deadlock in German relations.
On December 21, 1972, the FRG and the GDR signed an intra-German
treaty, the Grundvertrag(Basic Treaty),18 which entered into force on June
21, 1973. The premises of this treaty, in Bonn's view, were: (a) the continued existence of Germany as a whole; and (b) the presence of "two states in
Germany" that are "not foreign to each other."
A.

Background of the Treaty

A review of West German policies since the Second World War and
prior to 1969 will provide a more accurate idea of the difference this treaty
made. In the first phase, neither the Federal Republic nor the GDR was
officially regarded as a state in the full sense of the word, so as not to
diminish the chances for reunification. For this reason, the young Federal
Republic was officially described as an entity ad interim, so to speak, a
Zweckverband nur administrativer Qualitiit, a body corporate of merely
administrative nature, and it chose to be governed not by a constitution, but
merely by Basic Law, Grundgesetz.1 9

16. Cortese & Papini, De la doctrine Hallstein a la "Ostpolitik" (From the Hallstein
Doctrine to "Ostpolitik"), 73 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (General Review

of International Law) 124 (1969).
17. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., [19671 R.P.C., 497 (H.L.), 43 I.L.R.
23, 49 (1971).
18. Treaty on the Basis of Intra-German Relations, Dec. 21, 1972, Federal Republic of
Germany-German Democratic Republic, 1973 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil II [BGBI Il] 421,
translated in 12 I.L.M. 16 (1973). [Hereinafter cited as the Basic Treaty.]
19. Matz, Entstehungsgeschichte der Artikel des Grundgesetzes. Uberschrift des
Grundgesetzes (Origins of the Articles of the Basic Law. Headings of the Basic Law), 1
JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART (Yearbook of Contemporary Public
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During the second phase, the Federal Republic of Germany was considered to fulfill all the preconditions of statehood pleno sensu while the
same quality was denied to the Democratic Republic. Proponents of this
view oscillated between two arguments. One argument emphasized the principle of effectiveness." The other argument overloaded with heavy doses of
legitimacy the prerequisites of statehood developed in traditional international law, which the Eastern authorities could not display. Examples of
such legitimacy would be Bonn's claims to the realization of democracy and
self-determination by free elections. 1
It is noteworthy, however, that in the years preceding the new Ostpolitik, West German international legal doctrine took considerable pains to
reconcile the early dogmatism with the facts of both intra-German and international life. For example, it brought up to date the doctrine on unrecognized states and governments and developed it further into the more sophisticated legal construct of the "stabilized" or "pacified de facto-regime."2
The resulting doctrine describes the international legal status of all entities
exercising effective control over a certain territory without being recognized
de jure, without having to strain the traditional civil war scenario. It was
demonstrated, for instance, that in state practice after World War II, such
stabilized de facto regimes had not only taken part in multilateral treaties
but had also concluded all kinds of bilateral agreements without necessarily
being recognized thereby by the other contracting parties. More importantly, this also demonstrates that the territorial integrity and political independence of these de facto entities are as much protected by article 2(4)
of the U.N. Charter as those of states proper.2 3 Scholarly analysis of this
kind certainly helped pave the way to the third stage in intra-German legal
relations - that of Western acceptance of the full statehood of the GDR
- because it showed very clearly how the "all-or-nothing" concepts formerly used to diminish the standing of the GDR in international law had
become obsolete in more recent state practice, and that the step of concluding a treaty like the one of 1972 did not prevent Bonn from maintaining the
basic legal premises of its Deutschlandpolitik.

Law) 14 (1951). See also supra note 5.
20. The effectiveness of the GDR was only "borrowed" from the Soviet Union. Cf Carl
Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd.
21. R. SCHUSTER, supra note 1, at 49.
22. "Stabilized de facto regime" is the author's as well as Verdross' preferred term.
23. Cf J. FROWEIN, DAS DE FACTO REGIME IM V6LKERRECHT (The De Facto Regime in
International Law) (1968); A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT. THEORIE
AND PRAXIS (Universal International Law in Theory and Practice) § 404 (3d ed. 1984).
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B.

The Text of the Treaty

The Basic Treaty itself, together with its supplementary instruments, is4
a fascinating document in that it incorporates a peculiar give and take.1
The treaty provisions proper apparently grant to the GDR more or less
what it had long wanted. In article 1,the two German states promise to
develop "normal good-neighbourly relations with each other on the basis of
equal rights." 2 In article 2, they agree to be guided by the purposes and
principles of the U.N. Charter."6 According to article 3, they oblige themselves to settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means, to refrain from
the threat or use of force and reaffirm the inviolability of the border existing between them.2 7 In articles 4 and 6, they accept that neither of the

two states can represent the other internationally or act in its name and
that the jurisdiction of each of the two states is confined to its own territory,
and they further undertake to respect each other's independence and autonomy in internal as well as external affairs." In article 7, the two parties

24. Blumenwitz, Der Grundvertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
DDR (The Basic Treaty between the FRG and GDR), 207 POLITISCHE STUDIEN (Political
Studies) 3 (1973); Frowein, Legal Problems of the German Ostpolitik, 23 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 105 (1974); Mahnke, Rechtsprobleme des Grundlagenvertrages (Legal Problems of the
Basic Treaty), 7 DEUTSCHLAND-ARCHIV (German Archives) 130 (1974); Kewenig, Die
Bedeutung des Grundvertrages f.ir das Verhltnis der beiden deutschen Staaten (The Significance of the Basic Treaty for the Relations of the Two German States), 25 EUROPA-ARCHlV
37 (1973); G. RESS. supra note 1; Simma, Der Grundvertrag und das Recht der valkerrechtlichen Vertrage (The Basic Treaty and the Law of Treaties), 100 ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN
RECHTS (Archive of Public Law) 4 (1975); K. WILKE, supra note I, at 121.
25. The Basic Treaty, art. 1.
26. The Basic Treaty, art. 2 states:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic will be
guided by the aims and principles laid down in the United Nations Charter, especially
those of the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their independence, autonomy
and territorial integrity, the right of self-determination, the protection of human rights,
and non-discrimination.
27. The Basic Treaty, art. 3 states:
In conformity with the United Nations Charter the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic shall settle any disputes between them exclusively
by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force.
They reaffirm the inviolability now and in the future of the frontier existing between
them and undertake fully to respect each other's territorial integrity.
28. The Basic Treaty, articles 4 and 6, respectively, state:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic proceed on
the assumption that neither of the two States can represent the other in the international
sphere or act on its behalf.
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic proceed on
the principle that the sovereign jurisdiction of each of the two States is confined to its
own territory. They respect each other's independence and autonomy in their internal and
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state "their readiness to regulate practical and humanitarian questions in
the process of the normalization of their relations," and promise to conclude
a series of subsequent agreements, inter alia, in the fields of economic relations, science and technology, traffic, juridical relations, posts and telecom29
munications, health, culture, sport, and environmental protection. Finally,
in article 8 they lay the basis for the exchange of permanent missions at
their respective seats of government.30
In light of these provisions, the FRG appears at first glance to have
"given" to the extent of a complete "sell-out" of its former legal position.
The "taking back" begins right in the preamble where the parties state that
they both proceed "from the historical facts and without prejudice to the
different views of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on fundamental questions, including the national question.""1 This crucial point is further emphasized in the so-called "Letter on
German Unity," in which the Federal Republic stated that the Basic
Treaty "does not conflict with the political aim of the Federal Republic of
Germany to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination." 2
Article 9 of the Basic Treaty itself follows the same direction, providing that the treaty "does not affect the bilateral and multilateral international treaties and agreements already concluded by them [the two German
states] or relating to them."'3 3 This formula stresses the "non-affectability"
of not only the inter-Allied wartime agreements on Germany and the results of the Potsdam Conference, but also the 1954 Convention on Relations
(Generalvertrag)in which a Western style German reunification is a com-

external affairs.
29. The Basic Treaty, art. 7 states:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic declare
their readiness to regulate practical and humanitarian questions in the process of the
normalization of their relations. They shall conclude agreements with a view to developing and promoting on the basis of the present Treaty and for their mutual benefit cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, transport, judicial relations,
posts and telecommunications, health, culture, sport, environmental protection, and in
other fields. The details have been agreed in the Supplementary Protocol.
30. The Basic Treaty, art. 8 states:
The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic shall exchange Permanent Missions. They shall be established at the respective Government's
seat.
Practical questions relating to the establishment of the Missions shall be dealt with
separately.
31. (Emphasis added). The Basic Treaty, preamble.
32. I G. DOEKER & J. BROCKNER, supra note I, at 397.
33. The Basic Treaty, art. 9.
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mon aim of the contracting parties. 3 4 Further, in a statement relating to the
treaty, officially labelled a "reservation," the Federal Republic declared
that "questions of nationality have not been regulated by this Treaty";
while in a corresponding statement the GDR took the view that the solution
35
of the question of nationality would be facilitated by the Treaty.
To summarize, the Basic Treaty, together with the supplementary protocols, letters, and statements, presents a textbook illustration of the various
devices which can soften the substance of a treaty in order to make it acceptable, and which can reach as far as embodying an agreement to disagree on the very central question of principle, namely the national question.
Yet, not even this Swiss-cheese design was able to reassure the conservative
opposition in the Federal Republic. On May 28, 1973, while the Basic
Treaty was under parliamentary consideration, the Bavarian State Government applied to the Federal Constitutional Court for a declaratory judgment to the effect that the federal law expressing parliamentary approval of
the treaty was not in conformity with the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and
was therefore void.3 6
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT INTERVENES

About six weeks after the treaty had come into force internationally,
the Constitutional Court declared on July 31, 1973, that the law concerning
the treaty had just made it to the shores of constitutionality, but only as
interpreted in the opinion of the Court. In an unprecedented step, the Court
designated its whole reasoning, including those parts which do not refer to
the content of the treaty itself, as ratio decidendi, binding all West German
authorities with the force of law. Thus, an accurate understanding of the
legal ground on which Bonn must base its relations with East Berlin cannot
be gained without reading the Basic Treaty in conjunction with the judgment of the Constitutional Court.
In the Court's view, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) - and not merely a
doctrine of international and constitutional jurisprudence - assumes that
the German Reich outlasted the collapse of 1945 and perished neither with
the capitulation nor with the exercise of foreign governmental authority in
Germany by the Allied Powers nor at any later time. Accordingly, Ger-

34. "Non-affectibility" is a point that was emphasized in identical notes transmitted by
the two German foreign ministries to the Four Powers.
35. Zusatzprotokoll zum Vertrag fiber die Grundlagen der Beziehungen Zwischen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Supplemental
Protocol to the Treaty on the Basis of Relations Between the FRG and the GDR) BGBI II
426 (1973) (W. Get.); 1973 Gesetzblatt der DDR, Teil II [GBI. DDR] 27 (E. Ger.).
36. Wilk, Federal Republic of Germany Case Note, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1976).
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many as a whole continues to exist and still has legal personality, although
it lacks the capacity to act. The establishment of the Federal Republic did
not create a new West German state but rather reorganized a part of Germany. The Federal Republic is seen as identical with the state "German
Reich", although its territorial extent is only partly identical to that of the
Reich. The Democratic Republic equally belongs to Germany and cannot
be regarded as a foreign country in its relations with the Federal Republic.
The Court then went on to say:
The GDR is a state in the sense of international law and, as such, a
subject of international law. This statement is independent of any recognition of the GDR under international law by the FRG. Such recognition has not only never been formally pronounced, but on the contrary has repeatedly been expressly refused, by the FRG. If one
evaluates the conduct of the FRG in the course of its policy of d6tente
toward the GDR, and in particular the conclusion of the Treaty, as
factual recognition, then it can be understood only as a factual recognition of special kind.
What is special in this Treaty is that it is a bilateral treaty between two states to which the rules of international law apply and
which has the force and validity like any other treaty under international law, but between two states that are parts of a comprehensive
state of all Germany which still exists, even though it is incapable of
acting because it is not yet reorganized, with a unitary population,
within borders which it is not necessary here to define more precisely.
From this there results the special legal closeness of the two states to
each other;...
The special character of the Treaty in this respect may also be
suggested by the formula that it regulates 'inter se relations.' But it
does not regulate exclusively such relations and, therefore, does not fall
outside of the order of general international law; that is to say, it does
not belong to a particular legal order of a specific character that would
have been created only by the Treaty and limited as to subject matter.
That kind of construction is precluded by Articles 2 and 3 of the
Treaty which expressly name the Charter of the United Nations as essential for the relationship between the partners. The Treaty thus has a
double character; generically, it is a treaty in international law; in its
specific content, it is a treaty which regulates primarily inter se relations. Regulation of inter se relations by a treaty of international law
can be necessary especially in the absence of a constitutional legal order, as here because of the disorganization of the comprehensive state.
Even in a federal union, relations between the member states are governed, in the absence of regulation by the federal constitution, by the
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rules of international law. The view that any 'two-states model' would
be incompatible with the order of the Basic Law is thus incorrect. 87
With regard to the border between the two contracting states, the
Court took the view that:
[t]here are borders of different legal quality: administrative borders,
demarcation borders, borders of spheres of interests, a border for the
area of application of the Basic Law, the borders of the German Reich
as of December 31, 1937, borders under municipal constitutional law,
and among the latter those embracing the nation as a whole and those
separating member states within the nation (e.g., the Lander of the
FRG) from each other. That Article 3 (2) refers to a border of constitutional law results unambiguously from the rest of the Treaty. For the
question whether recognition of the border between the two states as a
state border is compatible with the Basic Law, it is decisive to qualify
it as a constitutional border between two states whose 'peculiarity' it is
that they exist on the foundation of the still existing state 'Germany as
a whole', hence to treat it as a constitutional border similar to those
running between the Lander of the FRG.38
Concerning German nationality, the Court observed:
If the Treaty had to be understood to the effect that the citizens of the
GDR may no longer be treated as Germans within the area of application of the Basic Law . . ., it would be in clear contradiction to the
Basic Law. In order to conform to the constitution, the Treaty . . .
requires the interpretation that, notwithstanding any rule in the law of
nationality of the GDR, the FRG will treat any citizen of the GDR
who enters the area of protection of the FRG and of its constitution as
a German . . . like any citizen of the FRG.8 9
As to the effects of the full knowledge on the part of the GDR of the
legal discussion surrounding the Basic Treaty and of the proceedings before
the Constitutional Court, the judgment concluded:
These circumstances serve in international legal discussion, particularly
vis-i-vis the treaty partner, to give the Treaty that interpretation which

37. Wilk, supra note 36, at 151-52.
38. Id. at 152-53.
39. Id. at 153.
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is required according to the Basic Law. This is in accord with a rule of
general customary international law which has significance in the practice of states when the question arises whether exceptionally one party
to a treaty may claim as against the other party that the latter could
and should have perceived that the treaty in a particular interpretation
is opposed by domestic constitutional law.4"

V.

REACTION TO THE COURT'S DECISION

This decision gave rise to an uproar in the GDR and Eastern Europe.
It was also severely criticized in West German legal doctrine, and by the
Federal Government, whose policies suffered, although it had nominally
won the case. The Court imposed a legal straitjacket on a considerable part
of the freedom of action Bonn had intended to create through the conclusion of the treaty.41 Indeed, the judgment contains strong language and
content, especially for the international lawyer, such as the legal qualification of the intra-German border or the last-quoted (above) paragraph on
the opposability to the GDR of the treaty content as seen from Karlsruhe. 2
In any case, it is a remarkable fact that - as the basis of relations between

40. Id. at 154.
des
41. Bernhardt,
NI61kerrechtliche Bemerkungen zum Grundvertrags-Urteil
Bundesverfassungsgerichts (International Legal Comments on the Decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court Regarding the Basic Treaty), in RECHT IM DIENST DES FRIEDENS, FESTSCHRIFT FOR E. MENZEL (Law in the Service of Peace. Festschrift for E. Menzel) 109 (J.
Delbrilck, K. Ipsen & D. Rauschning eds. 1975); DER STREIT UM DEN GRUNDVERTRAG (The
Controversy Regarding the Basic Treaty) (E. Cieslar, J. Hampel & F. Zeitler eds. 1973);
Koenig, Le traitkfondamentalentre les deux rpubliques allemandes et son interprktation par
le tribunal constitutionnelfedbral (The Basic Treaty Between the Two Republics of Germany
and its Interpretation by the Federal Constitutional Court), 19 ANNUAIRE

FRAN(;AIS DE

DRoIr INTERNATIONAL (French Yearbook of International Law) 147 (1973); Mahnke, Der
Verirag fiber die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der DDR.
Anmerkungen zum Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Treaty on the Basis of Relations
Between the FRG and the GDR. Comments on the Federal Constitutional Court's Decision),
6 DEUTSCHLAND-ARCHIV (German Archives) 1163 (1973); G. REss, supra note 1; Tomuschat,
Auswartige Gewalt und verfassungsgerichtliche Kontrolle. Einige Bemerkungen zum
Verfahren fiber den Grundvertrag (Foreign Relations and Constitutional Control. A Few Comments on the Proceedings concerning the Basic Treaty), in DIE OFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG

(The Public Administration) 179 (1973); K. WILKE, supra note 1, at 137; V6lkel, Zur Reaktion der DDR auf das Karlsruher Urteil zum Grundlagenvertrag (The Reaction of the GDR
to the Decision in Karlsruhe Regarding the Basic Treaty), 7 DEUTSCHLAND-ARCHIV (German
Archives) 140 (1974); Wilke & Koch, Auf0enpolitik nach Anweisung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts? (Foreign Policy by Directive of the Federal Constitutional Court?), 30 JURISTENZEITUNG (Jurists' Journal) 233 (1975).

42. Simma, supra note 24, at 17.
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the two German states - they have to make do with a treaty which is in
conformity with the constitution of one contracting state only if most of its
provisions are given a meaning and applied in a way which the other contracting state opposes vehemently and which it regards as a breach of the
treaty.
It is difficult to judge the precise degree of acceptance of this judgment
in the legal doctrine of the Federal Republic of Germany. But it is safe to
state that today a significant part of West German international and constitutional lawyers do not follow the Federal Constitutional Court's view that
the German Reich continues to exist forty years after the collapse of its
institutions. According to these authors, the German Reich lacks the minimum prerequisites necessary to be qualified as a state under international
law. The German Democratic Republic is regarded as having completed or almost completed - the process of secession from the Reich. This is so
although there is at least one obstacle in the way of its complete severance
from the all-German background, as well as from the Federal Republic,
namely the continuing rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Germany as a whole .4 Other influential authors see the German
Reich as a sort of juridical roof (Reichsdach) under which the two German
states have been, and still are, developing from the status of stabilized de
facto regimes towards full sovereignty, but nevertheless remaining bound
together in a way comparable to the British Commonwealth under the
Westminster Statute."
The German Democratic Republic, of course, considers such a view to
be in clear contradiction with general international law and the Basic

43. Bernhardt, supra note 1, at 13; Kimminich, Das Urteil flber die Grundlagen der
staatsrechtlichen Konstrukion der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (The Decision over the Basis
of the Constitutional Construction of the FRG), Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (German Administrative Newspaper) 657 (1973); Tomuschat, Die rechtliche Bedeutung der Vier-Mchte-Verantwortung (The Legal Significance of the Four-Power Responsibility), in FONF JAHRE
GRUNDVERTRAGSURTEIL DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (Five Years After the Judgment
of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Basic Treaty) 78 (G. Zieger ed. 1979).
44. See generally A. BLECKMANN, GRUNDGESETZ UND VOLKERRECHT (The Basic Law
and International Law) (1975); Klein, Zur Rechtslage Deutschlands und der Deutschen nach
dem Beschluss des BVerfG zu den Osivertraigen (The Legal Situation of Germany and
Germans After the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court Regarding the Treaties with
the East), 25 JAHRBUCH DER ALBERTUS-UNIVERSITXT zu KONIGSBERC/PREU13EN (25 Yearbook of the Albertus-University for K6nigsberg/Preuoen) 29 (1975); G. REss, supra note 1,
at 214; K. WILKE, supra note 1, at 77; Zieger, Zwei Staaten in Deutschland. Eine Betrachtung zur Rechtslage Deutschlands nach dem Grundvertrag (Two States in Germany. An Observation on the Legal Situation of Germany After the Basic Treaty), in IM DIENST AN RECHT
UND STAAT. FESTSCHRIFr FOR WERNER WEBER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG (In the Service of Law
and State. Festschrift for Werner Weber on his 70th Birthday) 127 (H. Schneider & V. Goetz
eds. 1974).
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Treaty. 45 It is important to note, however, that the GDR position becomes
less dogmatic the more the Federal Republic sweetens the special relationship it claims with economic advantages. To give an example, the GDR has
never thought of sacrificing the benefits which it is drawing from the socalled intra-German trade, that is, the understanding between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the other members of the EEC according to
which the Community customs barrier does not extend to trade between the
46
two German states.

VI.

THE ADDITIONAL PROBLEM OF BERLIN

To complete the legal picture of intra-German relations, one must examine the role and status of the former capital of the German Reich Berlin.4
Between 1945 and the beginning of the seventies, the international legal status of Berlin, especially of West Berlin, was a nightmare. What developed was more or less a permanent tug-of-war between the Western
Powers, which have persistently maintained that Berlin in its entirety is still
under Four Power occupation and administration,' 8 and the Soviet Union
which repeatedly attempts to remove the legal ground from under the feet
of the Western presence and to develop Berlin into an "independent political unit", something close to a third German state.4 9 Parallel to this, on the
intra-German level, the Federal Republic claims Berlin as one of its
Lander,5 0 while the GDR regards East Berlin as an integral part of its own

45. Cf J. HACKER, supra note 1, at 419.
46. Protocol Relating to German Internal Trade and Connected Problems, Mar. 25,
1957, 1957 [BGBI] II 984, 298 U.N.T.S. 131; for a discussion of the protocol see Hobson,
supra note 5.
47. Bathurst, Legal Aspects of the Berlin Problem. 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 255 (1962);
H.M. CATUDAL, JR., supra note 1; see generally D. MAHNCKE, BERLIN iM GETEILTEN
DEUTSCHLAND (Berlin in Divided Germany) (1973); see generally A. RIKLIN, DAS BERLINPROBLEM. HISTORISCH-POLITISCHE UND VOLKERRECHTLICHE DARSTELLUNG DES VIERMXCHTE-

STATUS (The Berlin Problem. A Historical, Political and International Legal Description of the
Four-Power-Status) (1964); see generally H. SCHIEDERMAIR, DER VOLKERRECHTLICHE STATUS BERLINS NACH DEM VIERMXCHTE-ABKOMMEN vOM 3, SEPTEMBER 1971 (The International

Legal Status of Berlin According to the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971)
(1975); see generally ER. ZIVIER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE LAND BERLIN. A SURVEY AFTER THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT (1980).
48. D. MAHNCKE, supra note 47, at 40.
49. Id. at 48.
50. 7 BVerfGE 1, 7 (1958); Schr6der, Der Berlin-Status oder die gegenwartigen Grenzen
der verfassunggebenden Gewalt des Deutschen Volkes (The Status of Berlin or the Present
Limits of the German People's Constitutional Power), in FONF JAHRE GRUNDVERTRAGSURTEIL DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (Five Years After the Judgment of the Federal
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and its capital."' The Western Powers have rejected both of these views; 52
while the Soviet Union has rejected that of the Federal Republic. 3
Only if this complicated legal mnage 6 quatre is fully grasped can the
weight of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971,5" be appreciated. This treaty, signed just one year prior to the Basic Treaty, has consolidated the formerly fragile status quo into international law without prejudicing the legal positions of the Four Powers. The decisive concessions on
the part of the Soviet Union lie: (a) in the provision that "the situation
which has developed in the area . . . shall not be changed unilaterally"
(Part I, Point 4); and (b) in the promise that the transit traffic between the
Federal Republic and West Berlin "will be facilitated and unimpeded"
(Part II A and Annex I)." The Western quid pro quo found its expression
in Part II B, according to which the three Western contracting parties,
while reaffirming that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and
the Federal Republic will be maintained and developed, take into account
"that these Sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal
Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it". 6 The transit and com-

Constitutional Court on the Basic Treaty) 294 (G. Zieger ed. 1979).
51. D. MAHNCKE, supra note 47, at 54; H. SCHIEDERMAIR, supra note 47 at 14.
52. D. MAHNCKE, supra note 47, at 77.
53. Id.
54. Quadripartite Agreement, Sept. 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 283, T.I.A.S. No. 7551,
U.N.T.S. reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 895 (1971).
55. The Quadripartite Agreement, Part II A states:
A. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that transit traffic
by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German Democratic Republic of.
civilian persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be unimpeded; that such traffic will be facilitated so as to take place
in the most simple and expeditious manner; and that it will receive preferential
treatment.
Detailed arrangements concerning this civilian traffic, as set forth in Annex 1, will be
agreed by the competent German authorities.
Annex I, section 1 states:
I. Transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the territory of the German
Democratic Republic of civilian persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin
and the Federal Republic of Germany will be facilitated and unimpeded. It will receive
the most simple, expeditious and preferential treatment provided by international
practice.
56. The Quadripartite Agreement, Part II B states:
B. The Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States
of America declare that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal
Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these
Sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and not
to be governed by it.
Detailed arrangements concerning the relationship between the Western Sectors of
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munication provisions of the quadripartite treaty were implemented by several agreements concluded between the FRG and the GDR, as well as between the West Berlin and East Berlin authorities."
The fundamental dispute over the status of Berlin is left untouched by
the quadripartite treaty system of 1971. This dispute found its legal expres-

sion in a number of deliberate ambiguities in the Quadripartite Agreement.
Noted above is Part II B, in which the Western powers declared "that the
ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of
Germany will be maintained and developed." 5 8s In the other authentic texts
of French and Russian the words liens, and svjazy are used. The English

and French expressions imply social ties (in German: Bindungen), in the
sense of binding West Berlin and the Federal Republic together in some

sort of political unity. The Russian word svjazy, however, refers only to
links (in German: Verbindungen) in the sense of traffic and other communications.6 9 This discrepancy not only led to suitably different wordings in the
official translations of the agreement in the Federal Republic of Germany
on the one side and the GDR on the other, but also to recurring practical

difficulties between the two German states in matters of transit traffic. Still
more astonishing for an observer uninitiated in the political subtleties of the
German question is the absence in the official title of the Quadripartite
Agreement of the clause "on Berlin", because the Four Powers could not
come to an agreement on the territorial scope of the treaty for the reasons

just explained. The "general provisions" of Part I thus refer only to the
"relevant area." The controversial issue of whether the Eastern sector be-

Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany are set forth in Annex II.
57. Protokoll iber Verhandlungen zwischen einer Delegation des Bundesministeriums ffir
das Post- und Fernmeldewesen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und einer Delegation des
Ministeriums fiir Post- und Fernmeldewesen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom
30.9.1971 (Protocol on Negotiations between Ministry of Post and Telecommunications Delegations from the FRG and the GDR on Sept. 9, 1971); Vereinbarung Ober die Errichtung
einer farbttichtigen Richtfunkstrecke zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 30.9.1971 (Agreement on the installation of a ColorCapable Microwave Line Between the FRG and the GDR on Sept. 30, 1971); Abkommen
huber den Transitverkehr von zivilen Personen und Ghutern (Agreement on Transit Traffic of
Civilian Persons and Goods), Dec. 17, 1971, FRG-GDR, 11 FOREIGN AFF. BULL. 35 (1971),
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 5 (1972); Vereinbarung iber Erleichterungen und Verbesserungen des
Reise- und Besucherverkehrs (Arrangement Facilitating and Improving the Traffic of Travellers and Visitors), Dec. 20, 1971, FRG-GDR, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 11 (1972) (all agreements were concluded on behalf of the FRG by the Federal Minister for intra-German
Relations.)
58. Part 11 B of the Quadripartite Agreement, supra note 56.
59. Docker, Melsheimer & Schr6der, Berlin and the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971,
67 AM. J. INT'L L. 44, 59 (1973). The English, French, and Russian texts appear (respectively)
in 24 U.S.T. 287. 307. 325.
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longs to the GDR is later left open by referring to communications between
the Western Sectors of Berlin "and areas bordering on these Sectors" on
the one hand, and "those areas of the German Democratic Republic which
do not border on these Sectors" on the other.60
Despite these ambiguities, Berlin has become safer and life there easier, at least politically speaking, as a result of the Quadripartite Agreement.6 For the West Berliners, the legal justification for the presence of
the Western Powers - continuing military occupation even forty years after the war - is a mixed blessing. They cherish, of course, the feeling of
security suggested by the presence of the Allied troops.
On the other hand, however, West Berlin has on several occasions had
the opportunity to discover the more unpleasant aspects of being a territory
governed by the rough laws of war. To give just one example, in the case of
United States v. Tiede and Ruske before the "United States Court for Berlin" in 1979,12 the U.S. Government contended that the proceedings, which
involved aerial hijacking, were not governed by the U.S. Constitution and
that the defendants therefore did not have the right to a jury trial.
VII.

INTRA-GERMAN RELATIONS TODAY

Ten years after the conclusion of the Basic Treaty (Grundvertrag), the
basic agreement to disagree which was built into the treaty still characterizes most legal relations between the two German states. It is true that
some of the bilateral agreements foreseen in article 7 of the Basic Treaty,63
as well as other agreements concluded as part of the overall package of the
Ostvertridge, particularly the agreement on Transit Traffic of Civilian Persons and Goods between the FRG and Berlin (West) of December 17,
1971, and the Treaty on Traffic Questions of May 26, 1972, significantly
facilitate the management of intra-German affairs." In other important areas, however, treaty negotiations have come to a standstill, as with respect
to cultural cooperation and exchange or on judicial assistance. Such assis-

60. The Quadripartite Agreement, Part 1I C.
61. Kewenig, Entwicklungslinien des valker- und staatsrechtlichen Status von Berlin
(Lines of Development in the International and Constitutional Status of Berlin), 39 EUROPAARCHlV 271 (1984).

62. United States v. Tiede and Ruske, Nos. 78-001 and 78-OOIA (United States Court
for Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 179 (1980).
63. Article 7 of the Basic Treaty deals with, among other matters, public health and
veterinary medicine, the transfer of certain payments, post and telecommunications, and joint
action against environmental damage at the border. See text of art. 7, supra note 29.
64. See the Agreement on Transit Traffic of Civilian Persons and Goods, supra note 57;
the Treaty on Questions Relating to Surface Traffic, May 26, 1972, FRG-GDR, 12 FOREIGN
AFF. BULL. 15 (1972), reprinted in II I.L.M. 726 (1972).
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tance is presently rendered without agreement and the arrangement is
working relatively well. 65 Judgments of the GDR courts have to be recognized before they can have legal effects in the Federal Republic but in FRG
practice such recognition has to be extended as a matter of principle, without any exequdtur or other domestic procedure. 6
Since 1974, official relations between the two German states have been
conducted by so-called "Permanent Missions." While the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany deals with the East Berlin Ministry for Foreign Affairs, its Eastern German counterpart in Bonn communicates with the Federal Chancellor's office (Bundeskanzleramt). A further
consequence of the inter se character of these relations can be seen in the
fact that according to the law and practice of the Federal Republic of Germany, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations cannot be ap67
plied to these missions directly, but only by way of analogy.
Questions of nationality have practical repercussions which make it the
most serious controversy left unresolved. The Basic Treaty (Grundvertrag)
judgment of the Constitutional Court stressed that German nationality is
the same in both German states and that, notwithstanding any rule in the
nationality law of the GDR enacted in 1967, citizens of the GDR must be
treated as Germans in the sense of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) as soon as
they reach the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany or come within
its protection. On the other hand, since the Federal Republic has formally
accepted the existence of the Democratic Republic as a state and subject of
international law, it can no longer argue that a GDR citizenship does not
exist, even though Bonn has declared that questions of nationality have
been left untouched by the Basic Treaty. In the words of one observer, because of the uncompleted process of separation of the German Reich, the
Federal Republic may continue to regard the legal institution of the traditional German nationality as its own nationality, and may exercise diplomatic protection for all German nationals, including citizens of the GDR.68
In practice this leads to a so-called "open-door policy" towards citizens of
the GDR arriving in third countries. The question of whether and to what
extent third states should respect the right of such persons to choose by

65. Renger, Rechtshilfeverkehr zwischen den beiden Staaten in Deutschland (Legal Assistance Between the Two States in Germany), MITTEILUNGSBLATT DES KONIGSTEINER
KREISES (Information Paper of the Knigsteiner District) 7 (1983); K. WILKE, supra note 1, at
290.
66. R. ZOLLER, ZIVILPROZEORDNUNG (Law on Civil Procedure) 1697 (13th ed. 1981).
67. Protokoll fiber die Errichtung der Standigen Vertretungen vom 14.3.1974, ara. 4; cf
G. RESS, supra note i, at 272; K. WILKE, supra note 1, at 257; STRAFPROZEfPORDNUNG
[STPO] (Law on Criminal Procedure) §§ 153 c, d, amended by 1976 BGBI I 2181.
68. G. REss, supra note 1, at 401.
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which of the German states they wish to be protected, becomes particularly
acute every time the GDR concludes a treaty on consular relations. It appears that most non-Socialist countries have accepted the "open-door" principle maintained by the Federal Republic.69
The improvement of relations between the two German states is far
less than the architects of Ostpolitik had hoped for. On the one hand, the
transfrontier movement of persons and goods as well as transit to West Berlin is easier and safer than before. On the other hand, and this weighs heavily, the gradual changes in the political system of the GDR which Brandt,
Bahr and Scheel had hoped to foster with the Basic Treaty more or less
have failed to materialize. There are, of course, several reasons for this. But
among these is certainly the transformation by judicial fiat of the Basic
Treaty from an instrument designed to serve as a modus vivendi in order to
break the deadlock between two irreconcilable dogmas, into a restatement
of positions which permit little or no compromise.

69. Cf. Frowein, Das Individuum als Rechtssubjekt im Konsularrecht(The Individual as

a Subject of Consular Law), in

INTERNATIONALES RECHT UND WIRTSCHAFTSORDNUNG. FESTSCHRIFr FOR F.A. MANN ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG (International Law and Economic Order. Fest-

schrift for F.A. Mann on his 70th Birthday) 377 (W. Flume, H.J. Hahn, G. Kegel & K.R.
Simmonds eds. 1977); Zieger, Deutsche Staatsangehbrigkeitund Drittstaaten(German Citizenship and Third Counties) id. at 522.

